Interpretation of Statutes - Pepper v. Hart

idñ uka;%S uKav,h ,nd ÿka iqúfYaIS kvq ;SrKhls'  jHjia:d w¾: ksrEmKfhaoS  jHjia:dodhlfha b;sydih fhdod .ekSu yd iïnkaO úh' fuysoS wêlrKh ia:dms; l< isoaOdka;h kï " m%d:ñl jHjia:dj wmeyeÈ,s fõ kï" y÷kd.;a ;;a;ajhkaj,oS" wêlrKh uyck uKa;%S uKav,h úiska ksl=;a l< m%ldYhla fj; fhduqùu fyda idñ uka;%S uKav,h"  ’jHjia:dj woyia l< foa’ w¾: ksrEmKhg W;aidy l< hq;=h' fuu Í;shg fmr tn÷ l%shdjla md¾,sfïka;= jrm%ido lv lsÍula ùug o bv ;snqKs'

Hart iy ;j;a kj fofkla Malvern College ys .=rejreka jQ w;r Tjqkaf.a orejkag tu úoHd,fha idudkH isiqfjl=f.ka wh flfrk uqo,ska 1$5 la f.jd wOHdmkh ,eìug bv yeÍfï iykYS,s .dia;= l%uhlska m%;s,dN ,eîh'  foaYSh whNdrh u.ska  1976  Finance Act  u; mokï fjñka fuu m%;s,dNh u; nÿ mekùug W;aidy oeÍh'  fuysoS mk; ksjerÈj w¾: ksrEmKh lsÍu iïnkaOj .eg,qjla u;= úh'  úfYaI flduidßiajrekaf.a ;lafiare lsÍïj,oS noao Hart g mCImd;S jQ w;r tx.,ka;h yd fõ,aia ys uydêlrK úksiqre iy wNshdpkdêlrKh" foaYSh whNdrhg mCI úh'  bka miqj kvqj idñ uka;%S uKav,h fj; fhduq úh'  tysoS Hart g Wmldrhla ,nd .ekSu msKsi md¾,sfïka;=j ;=< isÿ l< m%ldY jd¾;d ù we;s yekaidâ fj; fhduq úh hq;= njg ;SrKh úh' 

 

Mackay idñjrhd ish úiïuq;sl ;SrKfhaoS ;¾l lf<a" yekaidâ jd¾;d we;=<;a lr.; yels idCIs f,i fkdie,lsh hq;= njhs' Bg fya;=j kï" .;jk ld,h iy úhouo  " tfiau  kS;S{jrekag md¾,sfïka;=fõ iEu újdohlgu" jHjia:djla iïnkaOfhka jk idlÉPdj,g" fhduq ùfuka ;u kS;s Wmfoia oSfïoS fyda kvqjlg iQodkï ùfïoS fhduq jkakg isÿ ùuh'

  

fuu ;SrKh i|yd ,enqfKa ñY% jQ ms<s.ekSuls' úksiqrejreka fuu ;SrKh mßiaiñka ms<s.kakd w;r;=f¾oS " kS;s wOHdmk{hka ;¾l lf<a"  th idCIs iïnkaO Í;Ska W,a,x>kh l< nj;a " úOdhlh iy md¾,sfïka;=j w;r n,;, fnoSug ydkslr nj;ah'  

 fuu ;SrKh  Steyn idñjrhd úiska Tyqf.a Hart Lecture ysoS ish fodaI o¾Ykhg ,la lf<ah'  tu foaYkh “Pepper vs Hart:  A Re-examination”  hk ud;Dldj hgf;a 2000 uehs 16 jk Èk isÿ lrk ,o'S fuysoS Tyq m%Yakhg ke.=fõ idñ uka;%S uKav,h ksh; jYfhkau Tjqkaf.a ;SrKh u.ska woyia lr we;af;a  l=ulao hkak iy th msgqmi we;s ;d¾lsl yd ffk;sl isÿOdka;hg myr oS we;' Steyn f.a  foaYkfhka miq wêlrK ;SrK lsysmhloS   Pepper vs Hart ys úIh fCIa;%h my; jeà we;s w;r tjeks me;sÍula ;=< oekgu;a fuu Í;sh w¾: úrys;Ndjhg meñK we;ehs ;¾l l< yelsh'

jeäÿr wOHhkh i|yd(

www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN00392.pdf

http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/content/21/1/59.abstract 

 

 

 

See Further:

 

Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart 

 [1992] UKHL 3, is a landmark decision of the House of Lords on the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation. The court established the principle that when primary legislation is ambiguous then, in certain circumstances, the court may refer to statements made in the House of Commons or House of Lords in an attempt to interpret the meaning of the legislation. Before this ruling, such an action would have been seen as a breach of parliamentary privilege.

Hart and nine others were teachers at Malvern College who benefited from a "concessionary fee" scheme that allowed their children to be educated at the college for one fifth of the normal fees of a pupil. The Inland Revenue attempted to tax this benefit based on the Finance Act 1976. There was a dispute over the correct interpretation of the Act. The Special Commissioners charged with assessing the tax found in favour of Hart, but both the High Court of Justice and Court of Appeal of England and Wales found in favour of the Inland Revenue. The case then went to the House of Lords, which, making use of statements in Parliament as recorded in Hansard, found in favour of Hart. Lord Mackay, dissenting, argued that Hansard should not be considered admissible evidence because of the time and expense involved in a lawyer having to look up every debate and discussion on a particular statute when giving legal advice or preparing a case.

The decision met with a mixed reception. While judges cautiously accepted the judgment, legal academics argued that it violated rules of evidence, damaged the separation of powers between the executive and Parliament and caused additional expense in cases. The decision was subjected to an assault by Lord Steyn in his Hart Lecture, delivered on 16 May 2000 and titled "Pepper v Hart: A Re-examination", in which he disputed exactly what the House of Lords had meant by their decision and also attacked the logic and legal theory behind it. Since Steyn's lecture, several judicial decisions have limited the use of Pepper by the courts; the result of these changes, according to Stefan Vogenauer, is that "the scope of Pepper v Hart has been reduced to such an extent that the ruling has almost become meaningless".

Facts

 

Hart and nine others were teachers at Malvern College, where from 1983 to 1986 they took advantage of a "concessionary fee" scheme, which allowed their children to be educated at rates one fifth of those paid by other pupils. They disputed the amount of tax they had to pay under the 1976 Finance Act,^[3] Section 63 of which said that:

The cash equivalent of any benefit chargeable to tax ... is an amount equal to the cost equivalent of the benefit, less so much (if any) of it as is made good by the employee to those providing the benefit ... the cost of a benefit is the amount of any expense incurred in or in connection with its provision, and (here and in those subsections) includes a proper proportion of any expense".

The Inland Revenue, attempting to tax this benefit, argued that the "cost" of the benefit meant an average of the cost of providing it; if there were 100 pupils at a school that cost £1,000,000 a year to run, the "cost" per pupil was £10,000. Hart and his fellow teachers disputed this and argued that it was instead marginal cost, saying that other than food, stationery, laundry and similar there was no cost to the school due to the children's presence that would not be there already The Special Commissioners (an appellate body for income tax claims),ruling in favour of Hart, noted that not only was the school not full to capacity, with the teachers' children having no impact on waiting lists, but that the "concessionary fee" covered all costs incurred by the school in the course of educating those particular pupils It was found, however, that during debate on the Finance Act, ministers had made statements in the House of Commons which supported the idea that such "benefits" should be excluded from tax.

Judgment

High Court of Justice and Court of Appeal

Following the report of the Special Commissioners, the case was appealed to the High Court of Justice's Chancery Division, where it was heard by Vinelott J. In his judgment (issued 24 November 1989), Vinelott decided, based on the act, that "any expense incurred" referred to the average cost of keeping pupils, not the costs of keeping the teachers' children as pupils,reversing the Special Commissioners' decision The case was then heard by the Court of Appeal, which issued its judgment on 13 November 1990. The three judges confirmed Vinelott's decision, ignoring the Hansard element of the case and confirming that, based on the Act's text, "any expense incurred" referred to the average cost.

House of Lords

 Mackay, in his dissenting judgment, came to the same conclusion as the rest of the House on the interpretation of the Finance Act, but without the use of Hansard. Although he agreed that such a use would not violate Article 9, he argued that it was not appropriate:

Again appealed, the case came before a 5-judge panel of the House of Lords. They initially agreed with the Court of Appeal by a 4–1 majority.^[12] At the end of the preliminary hearing, the judges became aware that, during the Finance Act's committee stage, Financial Secretary to the Treasury Robert Sheldon remarked (in response to a question about places for the children of teachers at fee-paying schools) "The removal of clause 54(4) will affect the position of a child of one of the teachers at the child's school because now the benefit will be assessed on the cost to the employer, which would be very small indeed in this case", implying that the "expense" is meant to be the cost to the school, not the average cost of having a pupil there. As a result of this discovery, the House of Lords chose to reconvene as a 7-judge panel, consisting of Lord Mackay, Lord Keith, Lord Bridge, Lord Griffiths, Lord Ackner, Lord Oliver and Lord Browne-Wilkinson.

The court reconvened and issued its judgment on 26 November 1992, read by Browne-Wilkinson. Browne-Wilkinson found in favour of Hart, and on the subject of Hansard wrote that:

My Lords, I have come to the conclusion that, as a matter of law, there are sound reasons for making a limited modification to the existing rule [that Hansard may not be used] unless there are constitutional or practical reasons which outweigh them. In my judgment, subject to the questions of the privileges of the House of Commons, reference to Parliamentary material should be permitted as an aid to the construction of legislation which is ambiguous or obscure or the literal meaning of which leads to an absurdity. Even in such cases references in court to Parliamentary material should only be permitted where such material clearly discloses the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention lying behind the ambiguous or obscure words. In the case of statements made in Parliament, as at present advised I cannot foresee that any statement other than the statement of the Minister or other promoter of the Bill is likely to meet these criteria

In prior cases, the fear had been expressed that using parliamentary debates as evidence in court could violate parliamentary privilege, under Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 (since using parliamentary debates as evidence would involve discussing what went on in Parliament within the courts)Browne-Wilkinson held that:

In my judgment, the plain meaning of article 9, viewed against the historical background in which it was enacted, was to ensure that Members of Parliament were not subjected to any penalty, civil or criminal for what they said and were able, contrary to the previous assertions of the Stuart monarchy, to discuss what they, as opposed to the monarch, chose to have discussed. Relaxation of the rule will not involve the courts in criticising what is said in Parliament. The purpose of looking at Hansard will not be to construe the words used by the Minister but to give effect to the words used so long as they are clear. Far from questioning the independence of Parliament and its debates, the courts would be giving effect to what is said and done there.

Agreeing with Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Griffiths also wrote, in regards to legislative interpretation, that:

The days have long passed when the courts adopted a strict constructionist view of interpretation which required them to adopt the literal meaning of the language. The courts now adopt a purposive approach which seeks to give effect to the true purpose of legislation and are prepared to look at much extraneous material that bears upon the background against which the legislation was enacted.

I believe that practically every question of statutory construction that comes before the courts will involve an argument that the case [could use Hansard]. It follows that the parties' legal advisors will require to study Hansard in practically every such case to see whether or not there is any help to be gained from it. I believe this is an objection of real substance. It is a practical objection not one of principle ... such an approach appears to me to involve the possibility at least of an immense increase in the cost of litigation in which statutory construction is involved.

For several judges, the use of Sheldon's statement in Parliament was a deciding factor. In the initial hearing, Lords Bridge, Browne-Wilkinson and Oliver were all in favour of dismissing Hart's case, later changing their mind with the new evidence available to them. Lord Griffiths, on the other hand, was not swayed by the use of Sheldon's statement; he wrote that " I should myself have construed the section in favour of the taxpayer without recourse to Hansard"